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C.P. PENETRATION AND INFILTRATION OF ARMED AND SECURITY FORCES
(MILITARY ORGANIZATION - M.O.)

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C.P. PENETRATION OF ARMED AND SECURITY FORCES (MOO.)

I. Introduction

The Armed and Security Forces as social organizations being more compact than other social formations of Democracy, present, from the point of view of subversive penetration and activities therein special problems, but Communists claim that it is possible to organize even inside a jail or a concentration camp in comparison with which organizations inside the Armed and Security forces is relatively simple.

Before proceeding to the specific methods known to have been used in penetration and subversion of armed and security forces, keep in mind the character of the CP as a conspiratorial type of a political organization, whose members are ideological warriors. A setting ideal for most any type of clandestine operation.

Also, kept in mind should be the vast spread of C.P. organized or controlled mass organizations or "fronts", including youth movement, and CP's clandestine penetration and infiltration of public opinion forming agencies (newspapers, radio, the movies) all of which come into play as an aid in their penetration and infiltration and subversion work in the armed and security services. And last but not least, the subversion of the armed and security forces of the "class enemy" is a part of tactics of C.P.'s, adopted as a part of the Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin doctrine according to which no serious attempt at the overthrow of the government is possible without subverting its armed and security forces.

J.V. Stalin himself has taken out a double insurance on that score. His regular army is not only thoroughly policed from the inside, but he has a most well equipped political army.

II. Penetration and Infiltration

The basis of penetration in the armed and security forces is the spread of the influence of the Party and its fronts in civilian life and while activities in the armed and security forces are a special strategical and tactical operation it cannot be disassociated from Communism operation as a whole.

Potentially the penetration of the armed forces has its origin in the clandestine and semi-concealed or overt activities, in the schools, colleges, universities and the youth in general. The grounds for subversives are generated right there, crystallize into various forms of student or faculty organizations and from there find their way, either by conscription in war time or by purposeful clandestine direction of the Party into the armed forces.

A. General framework of recruitment

Like all operations, this too is a systematically organized proposition, operating from the center down. The Party sets up a clandestine (anti militarist) Military Committee. It would take much more time than is advisable to explore all the angles but briefly this is operated as follows:

1. The Committee, through subordinate channels (instructions offices) (not directly) ~~is~~ keeping in touch with Party members joining the armed and security forces, organizes and directs them. Similar setups under direction of the Military Committee are operating through youth organizations sponsored by corresponding C.P.'s

2. A similar setup under the pretense of "helping the boys" is operating through the controlled front organizations including fractions controlled labor unions. This part of the job is operated as far as the Military Committee is concerned secretly through the Party fractions in effective control of these organizations.

The above indicates merely the general framework of recruitment for such operations.

B. Next comes putting it into shape on an operational level, by division, regiment, company, air wing, ship, etc. This will be done by appointing one trusted Party member of C.P. controlled Youth Organizations to coordinate the others in suitable form in each formation. He is responsible whatever his rank and the only one in touch with the next rung in the setup. The above indicates the basic organization which is setup so that it can operate and probably survive no matter what the operation of the military unit, like the fleas it follows the regiment.

III. Auxiliary support groups

Auxiliary support groups may be setup through a store, office, farm, etc. adjoining the camp, airfield or naval base, or through the permanent personnel of such bases, fields or camps. This type of responsible is usually among the top of the setup. Specially trained as in addition to the subversive activities they may handle in camp they report directly or indirectly on the movements of troops or ships or material for the Soviet Military Intelligence.

IV. Communications

Armed and security forces in time of war are in continual motion which complicates greatly the problem of communications for the subversive underground operating within it. In fact this is one of the major headaches, because without adequate and frequent contact, direction becomes ineffective and intelligence worthless. I can only indicate the general method. Contact in the main is established by:

A. Personal correspondence is from the "responsible" wherever located to a friend or relative on the mainland, from whence it may go to a, b, c, d before it reaches the Military Committee or the Soviet Military Intelligence. Each responsible corresponds with his own "friend or relative" assigned to him for that purpose thus making for hundreds of contact channels, but the results are funneled by devious ways into one place.

The correspondence is by simple person to person code not discernible to untrained censors and difficult even for trained ones -- no false tricks are used. The letter may talk about cooties and other insects, which may stand for Infantry, Artillery, Tanks, etc. This stream of continuous information is then pieced together at the top and forms the background to more current information received by faster means.

B. Radio - the armed services radio setup if infiltrated may be used to transmit information to agents at the home bases or to the enemy direct.

C. Other means - this refers to personnel in air transport. The cable services and other channels of communication within and outside the service.

V. Selection of Targets

The Military Committee prefers to concentrate on certain branches of the armed and security services such as:

- Security Police
- Prison guards
- Armed Forces (Army, Navy, Air Force)
- Gendarmeries etc.

Within each of these services, the concentration is on the ground and training installations, especially on supply and communication services. The sense of that is there the greatest result with the minimum of risk may be obtained both from the point of view of organization, sabotage and intelligence. The general idea being that the stab in the back is the most effective.

Other points of concentration are the armed and security forces intelligence services, disinformation to the enemy being considered more important than accurate information upon him.

The orientation and psychological warfare sections are other preferences - as experienced propagandists they can create more havoc than in any other field.

No matter how the Military Committee may want to concentrate its forces, it is not within its power to determine the details either qualitatively or quantitatively, the total result is what, let us say 50% of its plan is carried out, 50% of the penetration force goes in the branches of service where the Military Committee wanted it and 50% where the wheels of the armed and security forces put them. The result will be a distribution of the subversive underground more or less according to plan.

VI. Subversion

There are four phases of subversion, not because they are separated by time - they may in fact be going on at the same time, depending upon the subjective and objective factors involved. These are separated in the main because they are separate links in the general operation - subversion directed by World Communist Movement through the "national" C.P.'s, "guided" by the CPSU - (USSR).

A. Moral Disintegration Work

The Communist Party of France excelled in this type of activity, prior to World War II and contributed largely to the collapse of the Army in face of Hitler's attack. The general pattern of operating this type of activity is to flood the armed and security forces, not with obvious Communist material which is easily discernible and may be kept out, but with literature which attacks subtly the morale fiber of the troops by allegedly exposing corruption, profiteering, brutality, injustice, and mismanagement at home.

1. This type of material may reach the troops in the form of pulp magazines and pamphlets, mixed in with unoffensive stuff. It may reach them in the form of camouflaged Communist journals, or alleged religious or veterans' journals, or the radio. The methods of doing this are infinite. It may reach them in the form of fake issues of a publication such as the Reader's Digest, where two or three articles of the many are designed for that purpose.

2. Subtle demoralization work can also be done through army papers, like Stars and Stripes, or papers published on a regimental and divisional level, etc.

3. The Communist Clandestine organization, of course, thoroughly exploits all complaints and grievances within the Armed and security forces, with the hatred or ridicule concentrated on certain officers, aimed at the officer staff as a whole, who are suitable for targets. This should not give the

idea that the penetration agents shun acquiring officer rank, especially in the services upon which they concentrate but on the contrary, they and sympathizers become the "good" officers boosted by the underground for their purposes. The game of dividing so one may rule or take advantage therefrom works its way in many subtle forms not easily discernible in the tension and stress of war.

4. The disintegration work grows bolder with reverses and defeat. "Soldiers" committees may then spring up to lead the disintegration to a conclusion. Disintegration work, too, has its several phases, but this should give a general idea as to how it works.

5. One of the most notable and unprecedented cases of quick disintegration was our rush demobilization following V.J. Day. Taking full advantage of the strong urge of the men to get home after the job was done, the Communist Party underground operating within the Armed Forces, strongly supported by the penetration agents and their dupes back home, organized the "back home" movement, causing a rush demobilization before the signing of a peace treaty, leaving USSR's military power supreme in Asia and Europe. Never before had a victorious power demobilized before a peace treaty was signed.

6. The "Bring the Boys Home" movement, led by the Communists in and out of the Armed Forces, revealed for the first time that the so-called ally had organized against its Western Allies while they were fighting on USSR's side. As small numerically as the Communist underground inside of the Armed Forces may have been, it was big enough to lead the rush sentiment to get out of uniform.

It is the function of this type of organization to fan sparks into flames and flames into conflagrations. Thus, a victory demobilization was turned into a defeat, a won war into a lost peace, leading up to the present war -- a master stroke of the enemy within and a tragic warning to us.

B. Sabotage

An attack on the morale of the armed and security forces is, of course, a preliminary or concomitant of other forms of sabotage. It is, in fact, itself an indirect form of sabotage.

Direct Sabotage becomes possible on a large scale only when the morale is sufficiently shot, in which case it can take the form of sullen resistance to duties and commands, blowing up of supplies and equipment, sneak extermination of officers, etc. Misdirection of supplies, misdirected or "accidentally" delayed orders, etc. --

where and how this is done depends on which echelons and services have been infiltrated. All of it is made to appear accidental, or as an honest mistake. There are many other forms to cover up and dissimulate. A skilled organization of fanatics can do a lot of these things which otherwise would seem not practicable, and still survive. Sabotage and possible measures against it is in itself a vast subject and requires specialized study for each branch of the service. Suffice it to say that a sabotage organization survives longest when it works in a manner so as to expose itself the least. Communist sabotage works in that manner.

C. Mutiny

There are various forms of open defiance in the Communist book in time of war generally associated with the concept of "fraternization with the enemy." The release of American prisoners by the Red Chinese in Korea falls within that concept. Its aim is to soften up our units and induce "desertion" by giving way to the enemy's pressure, or by directly going over to the enemy in numbers, preferably in strategic spots. This latter is a covert form of aiding the Soviet army.

Moscow has training academies for the various types of subversive warfare, in which the shortest course is three months and some run up to three years, and the men who go there are seasoned conspirators before they are accepted. This should give one an idea that there is more to learn than meets the eye, or more than could be told in this brief.

D. Espionage

Soviet military espionage seeks the type of information customarily sought by other intelligence services in this field, but operating through native subversive organizations it has facilities usually not available to others. Also, in wartime, it is not a purely intelligence organization, but is busy with demoralization work, sabotage, etc. - a subject for specialists and part of the total pattern of subversion.

E. Peacetime Penetration

In peacetime, the C.P. prefers to use its forces in civilian activity where there is much more leeway for deployment of their talents. The idea is that powerful civilian penetration in peacetime makes for powerful penetration in war time.

Even in peacetime, however, this activity, although on a vastly reduced basis, is not neglected. Large numbers of Communist veterans, lying in wait as it were, in the enlisted Reserves, will be blanketed in when mobilization comes, or else will enlist in the National Guard, which makes them free as civilians while keeping in shape for military purposes.

The C.P. does maintain a skeleton form of penetration in the regular peacetime forces also, but this is mostly a convenience for Soviet Military Intelligence, and there is no sustained subversive activity connected with it, except in countries which have mass conscription armies, as used to be the case in France.

VII. Conclusions

This being a cold war against the USSR, the C.P.'s must be expected to put forward far more than their usual effort at subversion. The main target still is the morale of the armed and security forces. Since the adversary is the USSR, perfect coordination of Soviet and C.P. clandestine activities is possible in every way.

Next in importance is Soviet military espionage, carried out through the C.P.'s independently. Tipping off the adversary as to soft spots in morale, armament, command and other dispositions, sabotage and mutiny may come at a later stage when the military underground has sufficient organization and the morale may sag under the stresses of war.

A counter-subversive organization in the Armed and security forces, starting with a few hundred and perhaps expanding to three to five thousand specializing in this problem may be an adequate insurance because as a security agency it can command the assistance of others. That is, it works with the wind, while the Communists work against it. A thorough study of the problem in all its aspects may require more than that.

The final objective of military subversives is, of course, to take over the Armed and Security Forces, or parts thereof, as the military arm of the new "People's Government".

The above should give at least a general idea of the problem, and perhaps a few suggestions of what to do about it.